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Abstract: Patients’ privacy is critical in healthcare but users of Electronic Health Records (EHR) frequently 
circumvent existing security rules to perform their daily work. Users are so-called the weakest link in 
security but they are, many times, part of the solution when they are involved in systems’ design. In the 
healthcare domain, the focus is to treat patients (many times with scarce technological, time and human 
resources) and not to secure their information. Therefore, security must not interfere with this process but be 
present, nevertheless. Security usability issues must also be met with interdisciplinary knowledge from 
human-computer-interaction, social sciences and psychology. The main goal of this paper is to raise security 
and usability awareness with the analysis of users’ interaction logs of a BreakTheGlass (BTG) feature. This 
feature is used to restrict access to patient reports to a group of healthcare professionals within an EHR but 
also permit access control override in emergency and/or unexpected situations. The analysis of BTG user 
interaction logs allows, in a short time span and transparently to the user, revealing security and usability 
problems. This log analysis permits a better choice of methodologies to further apply in the investigation 
and resolution of the encountered problems. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Theoretically, a computer can be made secure if the 
three main security characteristics (e.g. 
confidentiality, integrity and availability) can be 
guaranteed. However, a crucial factor can bring a lot 
of entropy to this secure world: humans (Schneier, 
2000). Yet, technology that is theoretically secure 
and not usable does little to improve information 
security because it pushes users away to less secure 
platforms. This is very common in healthcare where 
users of Electronic Health Records (EHR) frequently 
circumvent existing access control rules to perform 
their work (Lehoux, 1999), (Cranor, 2005).  
In the healthcare domain, the focus is to treat 
patients (many times with scarce technological, time 
and human resources) and not to secure their 
information. Therefore, security must not interfere 
with this process but be present, nevertheless. 
Ideally, users should be part of the solution and 
become more involved in the design of secure and 
usable systems (Ferreira, 2010). In fact, this design 
can many times raise issues that cannot be met with 
existing human computer interaction (HCI) 
knowledge and methods (Kainda, 2010), but must 
integrate interdisciplinary knowledge such as from 
socio-technical systems research, safety critical 
systems design and social psychology (Whitten, 
1999), (Sasse, 2003).  
According to healthcare legislation, both the 
North American Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) (Break Glass, 2012) 
and the United Kingdom National Health Service 
(NHS) documentation (NHS, 2012) specify the need 
for Break-The-Glass (BTG) or overriding situations 
(break the seal) as described in (Break Glass, 2004). 
BTG is required when static access controls are 
insufficient and there is the need to override those 
controls in emergency and/or unexpected situations. 
BTG permits the use of a more flexible and dynamic 
access control policy, which can be adapted to the 
users’ needs at the point of care. 
 In terms of BTG auditing, an email alert (or 
another type of alert such an SMS or a phone call) 
can be sent to a responsible party when the glass is 
broken (e.g. when a user overrides access control 
permissions) and this party or another entity can 
further investigate whether this access was justified 
(Ferreira, 2006). 
The BTG users’ interaction logs can provide 
regular monitoring and auditing functions (which are 
rarely used unless a serious breach needs 
investigation) but can also gather a rich amount of 
information concerning both security and usability 
behaviours (Iglesias, 2012).  
The main goal of this paper is to raise security 
usability awareness by identifying some security 
and/or usability problems regarding human-
computer interaction behaviour, with the analysis of 
users’ interaction logs of a BTG feature in 
healthcare. The identified problems can then be 
further explored and mitigated with the most 
appropriate methodologies. 
This paper is organised as follows: the next 
section presents background information; Section 3 
describes the use-case scenario where this research 
has been applied, together with the methods used for 
log acquisition and analysis; Section 4 presents the 
obtained results while Section 5 discusses and 
analyses those results; Section 6 presents some 
future work and Section 7 concludes the paper.   
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Security Usability 
An information system is usable when its users can 
perform the tasks they need in a fast and easy 
manner and routinely/automatically apply correct 
protection mechanisms (Saltzer, 1975). This points 
out that: (1) usability focuses on users; (2) people 
use products to be productive; (3) users are busy 
people trying to accomplish tasks; and (4) users 
decide when a product is easy to use (Redish, 1999). 
With this in mind, there seems to be an implicit 
assumption that technologies that are widely used 
are, by definition, usable. However, examples such 
as passwords and email security show that 
technologies that worked well enough when 
introduced can evolve into usability disasters with 
extended use (Sasse, 2003).  
Different approaches need to be applied 
regarding not only, authentication mechanisms 
(Kuo, 2006), (Brostoff, 2000) email encryption 
(Whitten, 1999), access control (Ferreira, 2011a), 
security tools and privacy (ZIshuang, 2005), but also 
issues that are aimed at achieving users’ goals, 
which may not be directly related with security, but 
have an element of security in them (Cranor, 2005).  
Security usability’s main goal is then to improve 
the usability of information system’s security 
features or even other features not directly related 
with security. In the later scenario, this must be done 
without compromising system’s security. 
2.2 Log Analysis 
Non-repudiation is also a very important security 
goal (Harris, 2012) and so auditability measures are 
commonly put into place usually for when 
something goes wrong and a thorough investigation 
is needed. Most of the times, the only way to do this 
is to recur to the registration of all activities 
performed within a system. This log of activities 
includes all accesses and interactions that programs, 
processes, and most importantly, users have with 
that system. 
So besides its most common usages, logs can 
integrate a wide and rich set of interaction data 
whose analysis can be used for other purposes rather 
than auditing. Users’ interaction logs can help 
improving data quality and integrity by allowing, for 
instance, the detection of healthcare information 
errors and inconsistencies (Cruz-Correia, 2011). 
Although logs may need pre-processing to allow a 
useful analysis they can be very valuable to study 
user modelling, improve activity analysis, 
monitoring and security (Xhafa, 2012). There are 
also cases where logs can be used to provide a better 
knowledge of users’ behaviour with the main goal to 
assist them in performing their tasks (Iglesias, 2012), 
(Shun-Hua, 2010), as well as identify usability 
problems (Palanque, 2011). 
3 USE-CASE & METHODS 
3.1 Legislation Compliance 
Many healthcare institutions developed their 
healthcare processes and subsequent healthcare 
information systems. Legislation is usually generic 
and abstract enough to allow this type of diversity. 
However, this also allows for systems’ heterogeneity 
and, commonly, difficult communication and 
integration (Cruz-Correia, 2007).  
On the other hand, there is also specific 
legislation available which focus on special parts of 
 healthcare data protection that needs compliance. 
This is the case of the Portuguese law for genetic 
healthcare related information that defines how 
genetic information must be protected and how and 
what healthcare professionals are authorized to 
access it during the course of their work 
(Assembleia, 2005). The law states that only a pre-
defined group of healthcare professionals, whose 
speciality is directly related with genetics’ study and 
treatment, can access data containing this type of 
information. Section 3.2 describes how this law was 
enforced using the BTG feature. 
3.2 Healthcare Scenario 
In May 2003, the Department of Biostatistics and 
Medical Informatics (currently CIDES - 
Departamento de Ciências da Informação e da 
Decisão em Saúde) at Porto Faculty of Medicine 
implemented a Virtual Electronic Patient Record 
(VEPR) (Cruz-Correia, 2005) at the São João 
Hospital Center, which is the second biggest hospital 
in Portugal, where more than 5300 patients are 
attended every day.  This VEPR is a subset of an 
EHR and integrates clinical reports from 14 hospital 
departments, Diagnosis Related Groups and hospital 
administrative databases. Around 452 healthcare 
professionals access the system on a daily basis 
(there is a total of 2300 active users) and visualize 
1525 reports in 1674 daily sessions (there are more 
than 9.000.000 stored patient reports but usually 
around 3.000.000 are available for access).  
The authentication mechanisms used for this 
VEPR are login and password and the authorisation 
platform is based on the RBAC (Role-Based Access 
Control) standard (Ferraiolo, 2001). Once the user 
authenticates successfully to the system his/her 
access control profile is selected and activated in a 
transparent way. This profile includes permissions 
and resources that can be accessed by that user and 
associated role(s). A web based platform (webcare) 
was developed to administer the access control 
policy for all VEPR users (Farinha, 2010). 
The described VEPR integrates reports which 
contain patients’ genetic information. In order to 
comply with the legislation described in Section 3.1, 
only a predefined group of healthcare professionals 
has direct access to this type of patient reports. The 
Hospital’s Ethical Commission and the board of 
directors have defined the group of authorised users. 
However, if needed, other healthcare professionals 
can access these reports if they perform BTG by 
overriding the stated access control policy and abide 
to its subsequent conditions and/or consequences. 
BTG was implemented to control policy override 
and block immediate access to the reports that 
contain genetic information to unauthorised users. 
When the users try to access a genetic report and do 
not belong to the authorization group, a popup 
window appears, alerting them of the BTG 
procedure, the legislation it enforces and possible 
consequences. 
The user needs to decide if the reason to perform 
BTG is strong enough to still perform this access. 
He/she is obliged to select a reason to execute BTG. 
Two of the reasons are fixed and are: [reason R1 - “I 
belong or should belong to the authorised group”] 
and [reason R2 - “I have urgency to see this report 
even though I have no permission, at this moment, to 
do it”]. A third option is also available where the 
users can [reason R3 - write his/her own 
reason/justification]. 
3.3 Log Acquisition and Analysis 
For the presented VEPR (Section 3.2) users’ log 
interactions are registered within a separate instance 
of a relational database system solely for this 
purpose. All records are stored in a structured 
manner in database tables where is easier and faster 
to search and retrieve them. 
 Users’ interaction logs have been collected since 
November 2004 but the data analyzed within this 
paper were collected from November 2007 until 
December 2012. Genetic reports started to be 
identified on collection in November 2007 so data 
are presented according to these figures. May 2009 
was the date when the BTG feature started to be 
used. The log analysis focused on the comparison of 
the period before and after using BTG features and 
verifies if these specific access control mechanisms 
can reveal how users interact and/or change behavior 
over long periods of time. As a means to easily and 
quickly reveal usability and security problems, the 
analysis presented in this study is mainly about 
summarizing the main user interaction behaviour. So 
analysis is made regarding data frequencies from 
search queries applied directly to the audit log 
database. It is possible to make deeper analysis using 
several data mining tools (Iglesias, 2012) to find 
more complex behavioural patterns but this is not 
the main purpose of this research.  
The search queries that were applied to the audit 
database for this study included: (1) the total number 
of identified genetic reports; (2) the total number of 
accesses to genetic reports by all users (authorised 
and unauthorised) before and after BTG 
implementation; (3) how many users performed 
BTG and how many gave up once warned about its 
 consequences; (4) the reasons chosen to perform 
BTG and the most common inserted reason R3; (5) 
if there was any suspicious individual behaviour 
amongst the users who most perform BTG and also 
give up doing it; (6) and if there was a specific time 
of the year where usage patterns were very different 
from other periods of time. 
Results are presented in Section 4 and their 
subsequent discussion is introduced in Section 5. 
4 RESULTS 
Before the implementation of the  
BTG feature (November 2007 – April 2009), 2875 
genetic reports were stored within the database. A 
total of 7774 genetic reports were available 
afterwards (May 2009 - December 2012).  
Table 1 compares the accesses to genetic reports 
from authorised and unauthorised users, before and 
after the BTG implementation. Before BTG, all 
accesses (n=842) by unauthorised users to genetic 
reports were successful. After the BTG 
implementation and from the unauthorised users’ 
attempts (n=5608), 3071 (55%) BTG accesses were 
successful while 2537 (45%) were unsuccessful as 
users gave up performing BTG after being warned 
(waivers). From these waivers, 2366 (93%) closed 
the browser while 171 (7%) preferred to select the “I 
don’t want to see this report” button. 
Table 1: Frequencies (percentages) of attempts (total of 
7176) to access genetic reports from authorized (n=726) 
and unauthorised users (n=6450), before and after the 
Break The Glass (BTG) implementation and use. 
 
 
Attempts before BTG 
(Nov 2007 – Apr 2009) 
(n=1001) 
Attempts after BTG 
(May 2009 - Dec 2012) 
(n=6175) 
 
successful  
accesses 
n (%) 
successful 
accesses 
n (%) 
unsuccessful 
accesses 
n (%) 
Authorised 
users 
159 (16) 567 (9) 0 (0) 
Unauthorised 
users 
842 (84) 3071 (50) 2537* (41) 
* From the 2537 unsuccessful accesses, which correspond to 45% of the 
total of 5608 access attempts from unauthorised users after BTG use, 171 
(7%) of these users pressed the button “I don’t want to see this report” 
while 2366 (93%) closed the browser. 
 
For the three reasons that could be selected by 
the users who performed a BTG access, Table 2 
presents the total number of selections that were 
made, together with the four most common reasons 
that the users inserted before “breaking the glass”. 
Figure 1 presents the yearly distribution of these 
four reasons. Moreover, there were also 6 empty 
answers (the users are obliged to insert a reason) and 
one user that refers that the system is wrong.  
 
 
Table 2: Frequencies (percentages) of pre-selected (R1 
and R2) and stated reasons (R3a to R3d) chosen 
by unauthorised users who performed BTG within their 
3071 accesses to genetic reports. 
 
 
Type of pre-selected or stated reasons 
Total number 
of selections 
n (%) 
R1 – I belong to the authorised group 834 (27) 
R2 – I have urgency to see this report 1229 (40) 
R3 – I write another justification: 1008 (33) 
R3a - “I’m the patient’s doctor and 
requested the exam” 
 525 (52) 
R3b  - “Thrombophilia studies”  116 (12) 
R3c  - “I belong to the authorised  
group” 
    57 (6) 
R3d  - “Pregnancy/infertility studies”      56 (6) 
 
 
Figure 1: Four most common reasons introduced by the 
users to justify their BTG accesses (yearly distribution). 
 
Focusing now on individual accesses, the top 
three BTG users were identified. Table 3 compares 
the total of BTG accesses and waivers to patient 
genetic reports regarding these three users. This 
comparison is performed between two moments in 
time: 2009-2010 and 2011-2012. Table 4 presents in 
more detail the number and types of reasons selected 
by the three users that performed most BTG 
accesses. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3: Frequencies (percentages) of BTG accesses 
and waivers (unsuccessful accesses) regarding the total 
number of attempts to access genetic reports by the three 
unauthorised users who mostly performed BTG (u_A, 
u_B, u_C), in two consecutive periods. 
 
 During 2009 and 2010 During 2011 and 2012 
 
Total  
n 
BTG 
accesses 
n (%) 
Waivers 
n (%) 
Total  
n 
BTG 
accesses 
n (%) 
Waivers 
n (%) 
u_A 81  47 (58) 34 (42) 155  90 (58) 65 (42) 
u_B 134  67 (50) 67 (50) 125  64 (51) 61 (49) 
u_C 95  73 (77) 22 (23) 72  53 (74) 19 (26) 
 
Table 4: Number and types of reasons selected by the 
three unauthorised users who most performed BTG (u_A, 
u_B, u_C). 
 
 During 2009 and 2010 During 2011 and 2012 
 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 
u_A 1 45 1 0 89 1 
u_B 67 0 0 64 0 0 
u_C 1 0 72 1 0 52 
 
 
Users u_A and u_B hardly selected reason R3 
to justify their BTG accesses. User u_A mainly 
selects reason R2 and chooses reason R3 to justify 
only two accesses (i.e., 1 trombophilia study and 1 I 
asked the patient’s exam). This user also mistakenly 
inserts reason R2 together with reason R3 at one 
time, and again gives “thrombophilia study” as the 
justification. User u_B only selects reason R1. User 
u_C mainly selects reason R3 to justify the BTG 
accesses and writes “I asked the patient’s exam” 124 
times in total. This user also mistakenly inserts two 
times the reason R1 with that same justification in 
reason R3. 
5 DISCUSSION 
This section discusses the results presented in 
Section 4 and gives some recommendations on what 
security and usability issues need further 
investigation, and what are the most appropriate 
methodologies to better understand and resolve 
those issues. 
Regarding Table 1, before implementing the 
BTG features , 84% of all accesses were 
unauthorised, but successful accesses.  
After BTG implementation, from all the access 
attempts and with 3 times more patient genetic 
reports available, 55% of those attempts from 
unauthorised users were successful and used BTG, 
with the most varied reasons presented in Table 2. 
Still, in total, 45% of unauthorised accesses (that 
would not normally be detected) were prevented, 
after BTG implementation. However, 91% of all 
access attempts were made from unauthorized users, 
so only 1 in every 9 attempts is made from 
authorised users.  
During the course of 4 years there has been an 
increase of almost 200% of access attempts. Before 
BTG features there were around 55 access attempts 
per month (in this case all successful) while after 
BTG features this number increased to 144 access 
attempts per month (71 from unauthorised users). 
Further investigation with qualitative studies such as 
focus groups is needed to make sure daily processes 
match the users’ daily needs regarding data access. 
Why the number of unauthorised access attempts has 
increased so much? Do unauthorised users need to 
access genetic reports this often? If so, why? (the 
legislation may not match real healthcare processes). 
If not, better monitoring and feedback needs to be 
made to avoid most unauthorised accesses.  
Also important to note from Table 1 is the fact 
that, in percentage, accesses from the authorised 
group were reduced to half. Does this mean that 
users belonging to the authorised group need to be 
re-checked? Maybe some users have already left the 
hospital and some unauthorised users should belong 
to the authorised group instead. Either way, the 
access control policy to genetic reports needs to be 
reviewed and updated. In order to do this, the 
responsible parties and board of direction, as well as 
the Hospital Ethical Committee need to be 
consulted.  
Finally, from users who give up performing BTG 
and are warned of the consequences, only 7% select 
the provided button. The other 93% simply closed 
the window. Further investigation needs to be done 
to find out why users do not select the “I don’t want 
to see this report” button. Do they think is a mistake 
and close the window to restart the browser? More 
specific individual user log analysis can be done to 
exploit this question (Table 3 gives evidence that 
some users can do that). If users do not need to see 
the requested genetic report, do they think that just 
by closing the window their access attempt is not 
registered as if it would be by actively pressing a 
button? Again, focus groups can be performed to 
better understanding the later question.  
Analysing now the results regarding the three 
reasons that users choose to perform BTG (Table 2), 
the most selected reason is the one that states that 
they have urgency to see the report (40 
%). This in itself does not say much. There can be 
 many different types of urgencies and some more 
“urgent” than others. The text which appears on the 
BTG warning interface may need revision and the 
reasons to perform BTG need to be clarified. 
Further, open interviews can be applied to the users 
to better understand what types and degrees of 
urgencies can commonly appear. Maybe one 
suggestion could be to have only one reason where 
users could introduce their justification and no other 
options as, for example, even with a fixed option 
reason R1 – “I belong or should belong to the 
authorised group” available (with 27% of 
selections), users still use reason R3 to state that 
they belong to the authorised group (6%).  
For the previous suggestion, there are also some 
issues to be further explored. The most common 
BTG justification inserted by the users include the 
fact that they are the healthcare professionals 
treating the patient and asked for that exam (52%)  
or that they requested it in order to perform studies 
relating to specific medical specialities (i.e., 
thrombophilia and pregnancy studies) (18%).  
All these issues can be related to how the access 
control policy is defined. Firstly, there is not yet the 
possibility for the patient to define or control what 
healthcare professionals can/should access which 
parts of his/her medical record, as stated within the 
European legislation. This is an issue outside the 
scope of this research but which needs to be urgently 
addressed in a near future as also interferes with 
healthcare access control policy definition (Santos-
Pereira, 2012). Secondly, focus groups need to be 
performed with the users to find out if the most 
common inserted reasons are/can be justified. If they 
are, the access control policy needs to be reviewed 
and updated by the responsible parties.  
Within the mentioned focus group study, another 
issue must be raised. Why have the reasons inserted 
decreased so much during 2012? In this year, the 
BTG accesses by users that selected reason R3 have 
decreased almost 60% when compared with the two 
previous years. Are users performing BTG only 
when they really need now? Do they select mainly 
the other two fixed reasons? Or have they access to 
this type of information from other means (i.e., other 
applications, paper documents), bypassing this way 
BTG features so that their accesses are not so closely 
monitored and registered? Has the background 
justification process become more active or 
effective? Is there any technical problem with the 
BTG features? Are they working as expected? To 
help answering these questions, qualitative 
observation and focus group studies should be 
performed with the users, as well as meeting with 
responsible parties to analyse the BTG background 
justification (is it being done? How? When? By 
Whom?). Quantitative users’ interaction log 
analysis, together with testing and validating the 
technical aspects of the interface, must also be 
performed.  
One more issue that can be directly related with 
the interface and technical implementation is the fact 
that there were at least two situations detected where 
a user was able to perform BTG without having to 
insert a reason to justify it. Maybe the user just filled 
the space provided with space characters, if this is 
allowed. It should be compulsory to select or insert a 
non-empty reason to perform BTG. Technical 
measures need to be corrected so that empty answers 
are avoided. 
Focusing now on the analysis of BTG accesses 
from individual users (Table 3), further investigation 
is required to understand why these users need to 
perform BTG more often than the others. In more 
detail, user u_A has increased by almost 100% his 
BTG accesses and attempts in the last two years 
(2011 and 2012). The other two users (u_B, u_C) 
have slightly decreased their BTG accesses but still 
remain high. Further research needs to be made to 
confirm if these users are just maliciously or 
negligently accessing the genetic reports or if they 
should be part of the authorised group and access 
control policy needs, once more, reviewing and 
updating.  
Individual users’ interaction logs seem to reflect 
what was also identified by the generic analysis of 
those same logs. It is also possible to identify in 
Table 3 that the users who most perform BTG also 
give up doing it a very high number of times. So 
maybe the issue of trying several times before 
actually succeeding when they see there is no other 
option but to press the “I want to see this report” 
button, may be happening. Observation studies and 
more detailed analysis of interaction logs can be 
performed to confirm this.  
Finally, regarding Table 4 results, the most 
common reasons to perform BTG which were 
inserted mostly by user u_A are in tune with the 
ones presented in Table 2. Also, the three identified 
users tend to choose the same reason every time they 
try to access a genetic report. Their behaviour 
regarding BTG does not change over 4 years of use. 
However, separately, they choose very different 
reasons to justify BTG accesses. Furthermore, these 
users choose a few times both a fixed reason (R1 or 
R2) with reason R3 to describe a BTG access. This 
must be corrected in the interface. Users must only 
be able to select one reason at a time. 
 In summary, and as a preliminary analysis of the 
obtained results, several technical, usability, security 
and even social issues were raised for further 
investigation. In order to fasten this investigation, 
each study to be performed should include the 
biggest number of issues to study. For example, if 
focus groups are employed, all the issues raised here 
that require this type of method can be explored at 
the same time. Is it also important to state that these 
studies should not be used to control or survey users’ 
actions to further punish them. The main goal is to 
improve BTG’s HCI, security, usability and its 
usefulness, and allow users to perform their daily 
tasks in a safe/efficient manner. 
However, a very important question remains: 
why were some users accessing genetic reports 
before BTG implementation, if they did not access 
those reports so often once BTG features were 
available? It may not be easy to find out why this 
was happening with the proposed research methods 
but maybe by correcting some of the other problems 
raised in the discussion, this type of unauthorised 
accesses can be avoided in the future. 
6 FUTURE WORK 
Future work includes further investigation of the 
previously identified security usability issues, but 
also the analysis of other issues that arose during this 
research, including if there are (recommendations on 
what type of studies could be used to further explore 
these issues are in square brackets): (a) accesses 
made simultaneously by the same login at different 
locations with different sessions [quantitative log 
analysis]; (b) many waiting sessions or automatic 
session locks [quantitative log analysis]; (c) any 
suspicious behavior relating with the number of 
times a user authenticates daily [quantitative log 
analysis & qualitative observations]; (d) any 
suspicious behavior relating with how many times a 
computer is used and for how many different people 
on a daily basis [qualitative observations & 
interviews]; (e)  any common authentication errors, 
mostly login or password problems [quantitative log 
analysis & qualitative interviews]. 
Other usability issues that also be analysed 
include if: (a) there could be any suspicious behavior 
relating with password sharing [quantitative log 
analysis] (Ferreira, 2011b); (b) there are any 
common paths to search for information inside the 
system [quantitative log analysis & qualitative 
observations]; (c) there are many backward flows 
within the searches performed by the users 
[quantitative log analysis]. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Users’ interaction logs can be a helpful tool to 
studying user-system interaction but other 
exploratory studies are needed to focus on user-user 
interaction, in which context the user is interacting 
with the system and which characteristics and 
individual knowledge the user has and uses to 
perform those interactions (Xhafa, 2012). 
This paper presented an analysis of users’ 
interaction logs in order to study HCI security and 
usability issues. Logs generate a great amount of 
data that can be useful as to unveil both those issues. 
Users’ interaction log analysis can be used not only 
in healthcare to analyse users’ behaviour regarding 
BTG accesses but also in other scenarios where 
confidentiality is very important (i.e., home banking, 
online shopping, etc). However, logs are not enough 
to change unsecure, erroneous or even malicious 
users’ behaviour. Other methods and techniques 
need to be used to further explore how this 
can/should be done.  
Finally, as much as users’ interaction logs can be 
a promising tool to be used to study and improve 
HCI and security usability problems, bad quality 
logs (many times they do not even exist), will 
certainly not be helpful in pursuing these tasks and 
so it is recommended that logs should be taken more 
seriously and be adequately and securely 
implemented and maintained. 
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